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1969] CASES NOTED
tirely consonant with the stated purpose of the amount in
controversy requirement, to avoid having the federal courts
"fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies."
A good deal of ancient learning will have to be forgotten, how-
ever, if this practical and sensible result is to be reached.2"
Strangely enough, Mr. Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the
Court in the decisions under consideration, once expressed his own ap-
prehension that the Rules might be restrained from reaching their full
workability and indeed prophesied the result of the instant decision.
In a dissenting opinion he wrote:
It does no good to have liberalizing rules like 60(b) if, after
they are written, their arteries are hardened by this Court's
resort to ancient common-law concepts.24
LINDA M. RIGOT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVATE POSSESSION OF
OBSCENE FILMS WHERE THERE IS NO INTENT
TO SELL, CIRCULATE, OR DISTRIBUTE
After spending nearly an hour viewing three eight-millimeter films
of "nude men and women engaged in sexual intercourse and sodomy,'
which had been unearthed during a search of the appellant's home for
gambling paraphernalia under the aegis of a search warrant, police offi-
cers arrested the appellant for possession of material which he knew to be
obscene, in violation of Georgia law.2 Defendant's conviction by a jury
23. 2 BARRON & HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 569 (Supp. 1968)
(Wright ed. 1961).
24. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 205 (1950).
1. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 251, 252, 161 S.E.2d 309, 319 (1968).
2. Any person who shall knowingly bring or cause to be brought into this State for
sale or exhibition, or who shall knowingly sell or offer to sell, or who shall know-
ingly lend or give away or offer to lend or give away, or who shall knowingly have
possession of, or who shall knowingly exhibit or transmit to another, any obscene
matter, or who shall knowingly advertise for sale by any form of notice printed,
written, or verbal, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly manufacture, draw,
duplicate or print any obscene matter with intent to sell, expose or circulate the
same, shall, if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene
nature of such matter, be guilty of a felony . . . . As used herein, a matter is
obscene if, considered as a whole, applying contemporary community standards,
its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex or excretion. (Emphasis added.)
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
Under FLA. STAT. § 847.011(1) (a) (1967), it is a felony to possess obscene materials
with the intent to sell, distribute, etc. However, under FLA. STAT. § 847.011(2) (1967), mere
possession of obscene matter is a misdemeanor:
A person who knowingly has in his possession, custody, or control any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immoral, sadistic, or masochistic book, magazine,
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was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which held that the ele-
ment of intent to sell, distribute, or circulate obscene matter is not essen-
tial to an indictment and conviction for possession of obscene materials.'
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,4 reversed: as-
suming -the films to be obscene under current tests,5 the First and Four-
teenth Amendments forbid making the mere private possession of obscene
material a crime where there is no intent to sell, distribute, or circulate
them. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Roth v. United States6 declared that obscenity would not be pro-
tected by the first amendment from governmental suppression. 7 The
issue in subsequent cases then became whether or not the particular
material in question was "obscene." The tests which have evolved are not
clear-cut; 8 it appears that a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to
agree upon a single definition of "obscenity."9
periodical, pamphlet, newspaper, comic book, story paper, written or printed story
or article, writing, paper, card, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film,
figure, image, phonograph record, or wire or tape or other recorded matter of any
such character which may or may not require mechanical or other means to be
transmuted into auditory, visual, or sensory representations of such character, or
any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use, or purporting to be for
indecent or immoral use or purpose, without intent to sell, lend, give away, dis-
tribute, transmit, show, transmute, or advertise the'same, is guilty of a misde-
meanor . . . . In any prosecution for such possession, it shall not be necessary to
allege or prove the absence of such intent. (Emphasis added.)
3. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 251, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968).
4. Three concurring Justices would have reversed on the ground that the search was
in violation of the fourth amendment, because the warrant was issued for the search and
seizure of gambling devices rather than obscene materials. The Justices cited United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1949), wherein the Court held that "exploratory searches
... cannot be undertaken by officers, with or without a warrant."
Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), where the Court indicated that
obscenity cannot be treated in the same manner as contraband, such as gambling devices
or liquor, for obscene matter cannot be recognized on sight. See generally Annot., 5
A.L.R.3d 1214 (1966).
5. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), the Court set forth the test for
obscenity:
[Wlhether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
Roth held that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, because it is "without
redeeming social importance." Id. at 484.
However, in Redrup v. N.Y., 386 U.S. 767 (1967), the Court indicated that the Justices
had not themselves agreed upon a single test. Two members of the 1967 Court, according
to Redrup, would not allow the States to suppress any material whatsoever on the ground
of obscenity. One member would allow the States the power to suppress only a distinct,
clearly identified class of obscene matter. Other members would not allow the States to
suppress obscenity unless (1) the dominant theme of the material as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest in sex, (2) it is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards, and (3) it is utterly without redeeming social value. Of those mem-
bers who adhere to the last test, some require all three elements to "coalesce," but at least
one Justice regards social value as an independently significant element.
The three-pronged test for obscenity stated above was first articulated in the opinion
by Justice Brennan in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1966).
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. Id.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Redrup v. United States, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) ; see note 5 supra.
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The Court, in the instant case, assumed the films to be obscene;'°
yet, it extended first amendment protection to them. Although the Court
recognized that the States possess broad power to regulate obscenity, the
Court refused to extend that power to regulation of the mere private
possession of such matter. It may seem that the extension of first amend-
ment protection to the films in Stanley is inconsistent with the Roth
case." However, Stanley may be distinguished from prior obscenity
cases 12 which have reached the United States Supreme Court, in that they
have all dealt with "public actions taken ...with respect to obscene
matter," 3 such as the use of the mails or interstate commerce, or the
sale, distribution, or publication of such matter. The unique feature in
the present case is that the State of Georgia sought to punish mere
private possession.
Thus the Court, in distinguishing Stanley from Roth and other
obscenity decisions, has redefined the constitutional requirements for
making the possession of "obscenity" a crime. The matter can no longer
be "obscene" for criminal conviction purposes unless it is publicly dis-
tributed, circulated, or sold. One element of the offense, therefore, is
"public action." And what may be obscene if sold or distributed may be
protected by the first amendment when kept for private use.
By this case, it appears that the court has taken another step in
expanding and developing the "right of privacy," first clearly enun-
FLA. STAT. § 847.011(10) (1967) utilizes the Roth test for obscenity:
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.
In Fort v. City of Miami, 195 So.2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 918
(1967), reh. denied, 389 U.S. 997 (1967), the petitioner was convicted for violating a city ordi-
nance incorporating FLA. STAT. § 847.011(1) (a) (1967), which makes it a felony to possess
obscene matter with the intent to sell, distribute, .and so on. Petitioner had created and
offered for sale in his back yard six fiberglass statues, which were, apparently, adjudged
obscene. Justices Stewart, Black, and Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari,
commented:
It is clear that the ordinance under which [the petitioner] was convicted is uncon-
stitutional on its face. That ordinance adopts the definition of obscenity embodied
in a Florida Statute [§ 847.011(10) (1967)].
Members of this Court have expressed differing views as to the extent of a
State's power to suppress "obscene" material through criminal or civil proceedings.
But it is at least established that a State is without power to do so upon the sole
ground that the material "appeals to the prurient interest."
The petitioner in this case was charged, tried, and convicted under a statutory
provision which contains no other criterion of "obscenity." This conviction therefore
rests upon a law incompatible with the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 919-20.
See State ex tel. Hallowes v. Reeves, 224 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1969), where the-court reversed
the trial court decisions holding FLA. STAT. § 847.011(10) (1967) unconstitutional, on the
authority of State v. Reese, 222 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1969).
10. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, -, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1244n.2 (1969).
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
12. The issue of mere private possession of obscene materials was before the Court
once before in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); however, the case was decided on
fourth amendment search and seizure grounds. See Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S.Ct. at 1245-46
n.n. 5 & 6.
13. Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S.Ct. at 1246.
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ciated in Griswold v. Connecticut.14 In Griswold, the Court struck
down a Connecticut statute making the use of contraceptives a crim-
inal offense. The Court said that a statute forbidding the use rather
than circumscribing the manufacture or sale of contraceptives invaded
a "zone of privacy" protected by the Constitution. 5 In Stanley, the
Court cited Griswold and said:
[F]undamental is the right to be free . . . from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy.
[The appellant] is asserting the right to read or observe
what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual or emo-
tional needs in the privacy of his own home.
Whatever may be the justification for other statutes
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the pri-
vacy of one's home.' 6
It may appear that, since this decision forbids the States from
making mere possession of obscene material a crime, the Court is mov-
ing in a new direction and may hold other "possession" laws uncon-
stitutional. However, the Court stated that statutes making criminal
the possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen
goods, will not be impaired by the instant decision because ordinarily
no first amendment rights are involved.' On the other hand, the case
may nulify state statutes, such as Florida Statute § 847.011(2) (1967), 11
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Warran & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890); Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to
Privacy, 166 Wisc. L. REv. 979 (1966).
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
The Court described these "zones of privacy" or "penumbras" thus:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment is one .... The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of
the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its
Self Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amend-
ment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Id. at 484.
16. Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S.Ct. at 1247-48 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 1249-50n.11.
18. See note 2 supra. But see State v. Reese, 222 So.2d 732, 736 (Fla. 1969) (citing
Stanley, holding statute not void on its face.)
It may be that the test used in FLA. STAT. § 847.011(1)(b) (1967) to determine the
presence of the necessary element of intent to distribute, sell, or circulate, may also be
nullified by the case noted herein. The statute provides:
The knowing possession by any person of six or more identical or similar
materials, matters, articles, or things coming within the provisions of [§ 847.011
(1)(a)] is presumptive evidence of the violation of said paragraph. (Emphasis
added.)
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which make mere possession of obscenity a crime. It should be noted
that prior to the Stanley case, some states had already construed their
obscenity statutes as unconstitutional when utilized to punish mere
possession of obscene matter.' 9
It remains to be seen how narrowly or broadly this decision will
be construed. Whether the courts will protect only that material which
is found in one's home, or whether the businessman who carries an
otherwise obscene film or book home in his briefcase or the individual
who carries such matter in his automobile will also be protected are
undecided questions. Future cases may turn on whether the word "home"
means only one's abode or whether it also means one's car or office.
This writer believes that the Court meant to protect all private pos-
session of what may otherwise be obscene material from governmental
inquiry and suppression. It is the individual's freedom to read, enjoy,
and think what he pleases that the Court is seeking to shelter, and
this freedom will not be narrowed merely because the individual is
reading a book in his car or viewing a movie in his office rather than
in his home. The Court said that Georgia sought to control its citizens'
thoughts and to protect their minds from the alleged adverse effects
of exposure to obscenity.20 But the Court answered:
[W]e are not certain that this argument amounts to anything
more than the assertion -that the State has the right to control
the moral content of a person's thoughts. To some this may
be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the phi-
losophy of the First Amendment.2 '
"If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch."22
SHERRYLL M. DUNAJ
19. State v. Strutt, 4 Conn. 501, 236 A.2d 357 (1967); State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J.
Super. 102, 245 A.2d 495 (1968); People v. Marzana, 31 App. Div. 2d 52, 295 N.Y.S.2d
228 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ; People v. Russek, 49 Misc. 2d 484, 267 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Dist. Ct. 1966) ;
People v. Roberts, 2 Misc. 2d 668, 154 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Utica City Ct. 1956) ; State v. Wetzel,
173 Ohio St. 16, 179 N.E.2d 773 (1962).
The California Supreme Court, when presented with the same issue as that in the
present case, accurately presaged the holding of Stanley in In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415
P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966). The appellant movie-maker was convicted of possessing
obscene films, which he contended he did not intend to distribute in their unedited form.
The California Court said:
Without the requirement that the defendant be shown to have prepared the
material with the intent to distribute it in its obscene form, the statute would apply
to matter produced solely for the personal enjoyment of the creator .. . .Such a
statute would approach an interdiction of individual expression in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. [Citing Griswold v. Connecticut.]
Id. at 819, 415 P.2d at 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
20. The Court noted that although Georgia asserted that exposure to obscenity could
lead to deviant sexual behavior, "there appears to be little empirical basis for that assertion."
Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. at 1249.
21. Id. at 1248.
22. Id. at 1248.
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